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Abstract 
 
This paper examines trading patterns and market integration using laboratory asset 
markets. Our markets are designed to approximately correspond to the trading day for stocks 
cross-listed in markets in Europe and North America. Some of our markets feature timing 
restrictions so that participants cannot trade across markets except during a fully integrated 
overlap period. Comparison of markets with and without timing restrictions shows that 
restrictions reduce trading activity and shift transactions to the overlap period. When asset values 
are extreme, price discovery can be impeded when trading restrictions exist. The measurement of 
liquidity suggests that trading restrictions increase overall spreads.  
I. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to use experimental asset markets to study trading activity, price 
efficiency, liquidity and adverse selection costs in the context of a perfectly integrated 
overlapping market in which both informed and liquidity traders participate.  This is an 
important area for study because, as documented by Eun and Sabherwal (2003), Baruch, Karolyi 
and Lemmon (2007) and Menkveld (2008), there has been a substantial rise in the number of 
cross-listed securities recently.  
An Experimental methodology offers a range of advantages over field market data 
because impediments exist that prevent full integration across financial markets.  Pagano and 
Roell (1990), DeJong, Nijman and Roell (1993) and Moulton and Wei (2009) show that trading 
costs differ across markets and trade becomes concentrated in the venue with the lowest costs. 
Grammig, Melvin and Schlag (2005) demonstrate that trading activity and price movements in 
overlapping markets are influenced by currency risk. Solnik (1996) and Bacidore and Sofianos 
(2002) suggest that even in an otherwise integrated market there is a bias towards price discovery 
taking place in the home market.  Moreover, the architecture of the trading system leads to 
execution preferences. For example, DeJong, Nijman and Roell (1993) show that London has a 
particular advantage in the execution of larger trades.  
  Our experimental markets are a perfectly integrated single market, where all participants 
can trade at any time, share the same market architecture exactly, face no currency risk or 
impediments to the flow of information. We then impose a single barrier to integration in the 
form of trade timing restrictions.  With timing restrictions, some participants can only trade 
during the early portion of the market, and others during the late portion of the market, but all 
participants can trade during an overlap period.  The markets are designed so that there are no 
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barriers or costs to trading during the overlap allowing us to make cleaner comparisons between 
overlap and non-overlap periods. 
Each experimental market is subdivided into Early, Middle and Late submarkets. The 
Middle submarket can be thought of as an overlap period, where both markets are open allowing 
both Early and Late traders to participate.  The use of an experimental methodology allows us to 
identify trading volume, price discovery, liquidity, and profits of both informed and liquidity 
traders as well as which type of traders are providing and taking liquidity. We are also able to 
measure informational efficiency, which cannot be directly observed outside of laboratory 
markets. 
The key contribution of our experimental analysis is that we show how the pattern of 
trading alters in response to trading restrictions that cause overlapping markets but unlike market 
based studies we can explain why trading patterns alter. We find that trading restrictions increase 
average volume per active-trader even though overall volume declines. By comparing markets 
with and without trading restrictions, our experimental analysis is able to show that there is a 
shift in both overall volume and per active-trader volume away from the Early market towards 
the overlap. Therefore, the reason for the rise in volume observed in overlapping markets is 
because there is a shift in volume from the non-overlapping periods.  
Our experimental approach allows us to identify the drivers of this shift in volume. We 
do this by studying the trading behavior of each kind of trader separately in each type of market. 
We discover that imposing trading restrictions increases overall limit order submission rates but 
lowers submission rates during the overlap. Moreover, the lower volume in the Early market is 
not due to a reduction in the submission of limit orders by either informed or uninformed traders.  
We measure a trader’s aggressively pursued trading volume by calculating the trader’s take rate, 
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defined as the number of market orders they submit divided by their total volume.  Overall order 
take rates are not different across treatments but there is a shift in take rates away from the Early 
submarket to the Middle submarket when trading restrictions are imposed which is apparent for 
both informed and uninformed traders. 
When we examine adverse selection gains to informed traders, we find that the existence 
of trading restrictions raises overall profits to these traders and makes the Middle market more 
profitable for the informed.  When restrictions apply informed traders are more active in the 
Middle market where their identity can be hidden more effectively. Thus, the increased volume 
in the Middle market is also being driven by the informed traders exploiting the most profitable 
time to trade. 
Our experimental result also shows that trading restrictions only lead to higher 
inefficiency in the Early period but not during the Late or Middle submarkets which is important 
information for investors and portfolio holders. Moreover, the imposition of trading restrictions 
leads to higher quoted spreads initially but during the overlap period the different spreads tend to 
converge. Therefore the benefits of higher liquidity in actual overlapping markets, apparent in 
empirical studies, appears to be more to do with the information benefits provided by the market 
opening rather than the overlap itself.  Since our markets are by construction fully integrated, it 
suggests that empirical studies of cross-listed stocks are not studying fully integrated markets. 
As well as being important for investors and portfolio holders our results are also 
important for policy makers and exchanges interested in market design. The overall message of 
our analysis is that the only way to achieve full integration of markets is to eliminate non-
overlapping trading periods by extending the trading day in domestic markets.  Yet even this 
may not always fully integrate markets since investors in widely different time zones have 
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different normal hours of activity.  Even if domestic markets were to open 24 hours a day, 
patterns of trade may still be similar to those observed in our experiments. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Previous research is discussed in 
Section II.  The experimental design, structure of the asset markets, and experimental procedures 
are presented in Section III.  Section IV discusses the results, and the summary and conclusions 
are in Section V. 
II. Previous Research 
A U-shaped pattern in intra-day trading, where activity is concentrated at the open or the 
close of the market, has been found in empirical studies by, for example, Wood, McInish and 
Ord (1985) and Hameo and Hasbrouck (1995). A comprehensive review of these patterns can be 
found in O’Hara (1995).  Much of this research argues that intraday patterns are driven by the 
release of public and private information. Kim and Verrecchia (1991), for example, show that 
volume increases around public news announcements because information is interpreted 
diversely generating a difference of opinion about future value. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), 
(1989) show that intraday patterns can arise when discretionary liquidity traders coordinate 
trading to reduce costs, causing concentrated activity during some periods. Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990), (1993) show that when informed traders have private information that 
dissipates quickly, concentrated bouts of trading arise early on in the day. These concentrated 
bouts arise as informed traders seek to exploit their information advantage before public 
announcements and the trading process diminishes its value.  Information asymmetry at the start 
of trading is therefore important for the existence of a U-shaped trading pattern. Empirical 
evidence by Bessembinder, Chan and Seguin (1996) has shown that both public and private 
information are important determinants of volume in stock markets. 
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A. International Trading Patterns and Integration 
Werner and Kleidon (1996) analyse intraday volume, volatility and spread patterns for 
London stocks cross-listed in New York.  They argue that if the markets for these securities are 
fully integrated there will be a bout of concentrated trading coinciding with the open of the first 
market (London) caused by the accumulation of private information.  But, because fully 
integrated markets allow information to flow from one market to another this trading will cause 
private information to be reflected in both markets, preventing a further bout of concentrated 
trading taking place at the open of the second market (New York).1  Despite London trading for 
six hours before New York opens they find that each market generates its own U-shaped trading 
patterns resembling those of control firms that are not cross-listed.  This suggests that the 
markets are not fully integrated as private information accumulates prior to the opening of each 
market leading to a bout of concentrated trading at the open of each market. They also find that 
the overlap period attracts a disproportionate amount of trading activity, a feature which is most 
pronounced for the New York market.  
Evidence of concentrated trading is also provided by Menkveld (2008) who examines 
Dutch shares cross-listed in New York and in European markets. When the NYSE opens, UK 
volume in Dutch securities rises by as much as 79% but when the UK closes, NYSE volume falls 
by 96%. In Amsterdam, volume rises by 68% when NYSE opens but NYSE volume falls by 
29% when Amsterdam closes. Trade concentration in overlapping markets is also reported by 
Hupperets and Menkveld (2002) and by Biais and Martinez (2004).   
                                                
1 No concentrated trading takes place as the information advantage of informed traders has dissipated due to trading 
taking place in the open market.  
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Menkveld (2008) argues that when some traders face trading restrictions in their home 
market, trade and price discovery is concentrated during overlaps. This happens because 
informed traders who are able to trade in both home and foreign markets split their orders across 
venues to limit the information revealed by their trading activities.  Eun and Sabherwahl (2003) 
study stocks cross-listed on the Canadian and US markets and find that price discovery in the US 
rises as the US market takes a larger proportion of overall trading.  
Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2007) present a theoretical model explaining the variation 
in trading volume that is attracted to a foreign venue after a cross-listing occurs. Their model 
shows that the distribution of trading volume in the foreign venue will depend on the correlation 
of the cross-listed asset returns with the returns of domestic assets traded in the foreign market. 
When domestic asset returns in the foreign market are correlated with cross-listed returns, market 
makers can infer prices from the order flow of these securities. Empirically, their predictions are 
borne out for stocks cross-listed on US exchanges.  
Studies of strategic behavior in multiple markets also provide important insights about 
cross-listed securities. Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) extend the model of Kyle (1985) and 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) to multiple markets. Strategic choices by informed participants 
leads to trading in markets that are thick with liquidity traders causing a shift in activity to the 
most liquid market. Migration to overlapping markets because costs are lower is borne out by 
Werner and Kleidon (1996) and Moulton and Wei (2009) who find that spreads are lower during 
the overlap period. Karyoli (2006) provides an extensive review of research that examines 
integration and cross-listed markets. 
B. Microstructure Experiments 
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As the survey of experimental studies by Sunder (1995) indicates, a strong focus of 
experimental asset markets has been on examining information aggregation. Barner, Feri and 
Plott (2005) create markets where information arrives during the experiment asymmetrically. 
Their experiment shows that limit orders placed by informed traders early on in the trading 
period cause private information to be revealed to the market making it informationally efficient. 
In Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2005) fully informed and uninformed traders with target cash 
balances, participate in a limit order market. Their objective is to discover which traders provide 
liquidity to the market as trading evolves. Their results show that high levels of information 
aggregation take place during the first minutes of trading and that liquidity provision shifts 
towards informed traders as trading progresses. Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2009) also 
examine price aggregation but in a market of informed, liquidity and noise traders. They show 
that noise traders, who have no exogenous reason to trade, add to volume, reduce price impact 
effects and increase liquidity, but reduce the informativeness of prices. 
 Qi and Ochs (2009) study information flows between fully segmented markets in an 
experiment in which there are two markets for an asset that provide identical dividend streams in 
each market. Participants can view trading in both markets but trade is segregated so that 
participants can only trade in one. Despite segmentation, information held by insiders passes 
from one segmented market onto another.  Ackert, Mazzotta and Qi (2011) also examine the 
impact of market segmentation by examining the market for two assets with different dividend 
claims. They show that when some participants cannot freely trade an asset it commands a higher 
risk premium, which is necessary to attract unrestricted traders. Both these papers make 
important contributions to our understanding of segmented markets but do not address the issue 
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of trading patterns in overlap markets or the interaction between informed and uninformed 
traders in an overlapping market. 
III. Experimental Design 
  Our market sessions utilize a customized program written using the Fischbacher (2007) 
z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments) to implement twenty 
experimental computerized double auction markets of three minutes. In each session participants 
trade a single risky security in a market that is subdivided into Early, Middle and Late 
submarkets, each one minute in length.  In some instances, subjects had trading privileges in only 
some of the submarkets.2 During each of the three submarkets, traders could post and accept bids 
and offers in the double auction.  After the Late submarket was completed, the asset value was 
revealed to all subjects, and all shares of the experimental asset were liquidated.  Subjects’ 
earnings for the period were recorded, and the next period would commence.  
A.  The Experimental Asset and the Information Structure 
 Before the start of each Early submarket, traders received a supply of shares.  All subjects 
were told that the asset featured four equally likely liquidating dividends amounting to 20, 40, 60 
or 80 trading dollars paid at the end of each trading period.  In some periods, which for 
exposition purposes we label as NoInfo, no further information about the liquidating dividend 
was provided to any trader so that in these periods all traders were uninformed.3   In other 
                                                
2 Our design with timing restrictions therefore contrasts with Qi and Ochs (2009) who partition markets into a 
domestic and a foreign venue and prevent traders from participating outside of their designated market, but have no 
timing restrictions. This difference stems from our diverse objectives.  Whereas their aim is to examine a legally 
separated market, ours is to examine a fully integrated one.   
3 This is a treatment also incorporated into the experiments undertaken by Qi and Ochs (2009). 
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periods, some traders were perfectly informed and knew the value of the liquidating dividend.  
The existence of informed traders was publicly announced but both the number and identities of 
informed traders were not disclosed to the market.  
 In addition to shares, subjects also received a cash endowment (in trading dollars) before 
the start of each Early submarket.  We induced liquidity trading by giving some subjects cash 
bonuses or penalties.  To encourage some traders to hold more of their wealth in cash and less in 
the risky asset, some traders received a five percent bonus on their cash balance, paid at the end 
of the Late submarket, just before the risky asset was liquidated.   To encourage other liquidity 
traders to hold a greater proportion of their wealth in shares, and therefore actively buy more 
during trading, other traders incur a five percent penalty, also paid immediately prior to 
liquidation.   
Table 1 
 The starting positions associated with each of the trader roles (liquidity buyers, liquidity 
sellers, and informed traders) are summarized in Table 1.   The role assigned to each subject was 
randomized over the twenty markets in the session.  At the end of each Late market, individual 
earnings were calculated as a subject’s ending cash balance, plus or minus any bonus or penalty, 
plus the liquidation value of his or her risky assets.  At the end of the session, each subject 
received a cash sum proportional to his or her experimental earnings totaled over the twenty 
periods. 
B.  Timing Restrictions 
In addition to their roles as informed traders, liquidity buyers or liquidity sellers, subjects 
were also designated as Early, Late or Both traders.  Early traders were allowed to trade in the 
Early and the Middle submarkets and were prohibited from trading in the Late submarket.  Late 
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traders were able to trade in the Middle and Late submarkets but were prohibited from trading in 
the Early submarket. Both traders were permitted to trade in all three submarkets.  Active traders 
could post and accept bids and offers.  Inactive traders could only observe bids, offers and trades.  
Active and inactive traders saw the same computer screens, but inactive traders had 
automatically disabled terminals during the inactive period. These timing restrictions are 
presented in Table 2. In most treatments, there were an equal number of Early traders and Late 
traders; with equal numbers being assigned to roles as informed, liquidity buyers, and liquidity 
sellers.  In the NoRes treatment all subjects are Both traders.  
C.  Experimental Structure 
The experimental design is summarized in Table 2. The main treatment, labeled IR, 
allows informed traders to participate but imposes timing restrictions. As control treatments, 
NoInfo has no informed traders, but does feature timing restrictions and NoRes has informed 
traders, but no timing restrictions. 
Table 2 
 In addition to the trading restrictions described above, there were also wealth constraints.  
A subject was not allowed to carry a negative cash balance, i.e., borrow.  However there was, in 
aggregate, sufficient cash to purchase the entire supply of shares, even if the experimental asset 
trades at a price of $100, considerably higher than the maximum liquidation value.  Short sales 
were permitted but to prevent bankruptcy the seller had to have at least $100 in cash per share 
shorted.   
D. Market Architecture 
All traders participate in a continuous double auction market for a single asset.  Each 
trader can submit limit and market orders for one share of the experimental security at a time. 
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Limit orders are executed strictly on the basis of price then time priority. Market orders are 
placed and executed by trading against another trader’s posted bids (market sell order) or asks 
(market buy order).  Each trader can post bid and ask prices at any time and can post multiple 
orders either at the same or at different prices if they choose to do so. When posting bid and ask 
prices, traders do not need to post prices within the inside spread. A trader can cancel an 
outstanding order at any time.  
Throughout each submarket all outstanding bids and asks are visible to every trader, 
presented on the basis of price then time priority so that the inside bid and ask prices are clearly 
visible to all market participants along with depth on both sides of the market. As trades arise, 
they are immediately reported to the market as a whole.  Transaction prices appear in 
chronological order as a list on the screen. The identity of traders posting or accepting quotes is 
anonymous so that traders cannot tell whether posted quotes come from informed or liquidity 
traders. 
Our experimental design has created a perfectly integrated market during the overlap that 
is likely to be more integrated than the overlap of actual markets. Our overlap is free from 
currency risk and information or cost distortions that cause a home country bias. Within the 
framework we use we allow order flow from Early traders to interact with order flow from Late 
traders during the overlap ensuring there is no fragmentation of order flow information.4 The 
advantage of creating a fully integrated market is that we can examine exclusively the impact 
that timing restrictions have on trading behavior. 
IV. Results 
                                                
4 In actual markets cross-listed securities are listed on competing trading platforms that do not allow order flow from 
one system to interact with another causing a form of fragmentation.  
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 Our results are drawn from eleven sessions, each containing twenty three- minute 
markets, totaling two hundred and twenty experimental auctions.  Each session lasted 
approximately two-and-a-half hours, including time spent reviewing instructions and watching a 
software demonstration.  Participants for sessions one to seven were drawn from the student 
population of the University of Cincinnati. Participants for sessions eight to eleven were drawn 
from Aston Business School. Most sessions used 17 or 18 subjects.  However, we also ran two 
24-subject sessions as a robustness check.  All sessions were conducted using “trading dollars” 
which were converted to local currency at the end of the session.  Typical payouts were between 
$20 USD and $25 USD per subject.5 
 Our results tables report the average of each variable, such as volume, pricing efficiency 
and liquidity, by submarket, treatment and cohort. We analyze these data using a within-subjects 
design repeated-measures ANOVA, which is a conservative but robust procedure for analyzing 
experimental data.  The ANOVA design and results (two-tailed p-values) are beneath each 
results table. In our core analysis for each dependent variable, the Main Effects that we examine 
are the timing restriction (2 categories: with timing restrictions and without timing restrictions), 
the information restriction (2 categories: with informed traders, without informed traders) and 
the submarket (3 categories: Early, Middle or Late submarket).  Interaction Effects between the 
independent variables allow us to observe whether the effects of timing and information 
restrictions are dissimilar in different submarkets.6  The statistical significance of the interaction 
between the effects of submarket and timing restrictions leads us to undertake additional two-
                                                
5 We do not report session by session results in the paper but these are available from the corresponding author. 
6As we have no market without informed traders and trading restrictions, our design does not allow estimation of the 
interaction effect between information and timing. 
 13 
way ANOVAs to examine the effect of timing restrictions and information restrictions for each 
submarket separately, and one-way ANOVAs of the effect of submarket for the cases 
distinguished by timing restriction.7  
A. Volume 
Aggregated trading volume data associated with each session, and the fraction of volume 
for each submarket and treatment are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3  
NoRes, NoInfo and IR average trading volume per market are 89.8, 69.5 and 71.2 respectively 
indicating that the imposition of trading restrictions reduces volume. The similarity of NoInfo 
and IR mean market volume suggest that it is the trading restriction that is important, not the 
absence of informed traders. This is confirmed by the ANOVA results as trading restrictions are 
found to influence market volume (p<0.001) but information restrictions do not (p=0.641).8  
The fraction of transactions in the Early, Middle and Late submarkets show how trading 
restrictions alter the pattern of trading.  For the NoRes treatment trading is concentrated in the 
Early submarket as about 42% of trading occurs in the Early period, 32% in the Middle period 
                                                
7 We apply the Tukey Honestly Significant Difference test to identify pair-wise differences between the submarkets 
with and without timing restrictions.  We also examine 4-way ANOVAs, including additionally the cohort as a 
factor. The results for the original 3 factors (timing, information and submarket) experience negligible changes, 
while post hoc testing of the homogeneity of the cohorts, also using the Tukey Honestly Significant Difference test, 
did not point to any systematic differences between the cohorts from the University of Cincinnati and the Aston 
Business School.   
8 These results are for an ANOVA on the level of volume aggregated across all submarkets, rather than the level of 
volume in each submarket. In this case, only the main effects of timing restrictions and information restrictions are 
examined. These results are in the ANOVA results column labelled “Total” below Table 3. 
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and 26% in the Late period.  ANOVA analysis indicates that the NoRes submarkets have 
statistically different volume (p<0.001), with pair-wise tests showing that Early submarket 
volume is significantly higher than both Middle and Late submarket volume (p<0.001), and that 
Middle submarket volume is significantly higher than Late submarket volume (p=0.043), when 
there are no timing restrictions. These differences are consistent with the intraday trading 
patterns first discovered by Wood, McInish and Ord (1985).  
With trading restrictions, trading becomes concentrated in the Middle submarket.  On 
average for both the NoInfo and IR treatments, trading in the Middle period represents almost 
60% of all trading activity and does not conform to the patterns observed by Wood et al. (1985). 
ANOVA analysis of submarket volume indicates that both timing restrictions and submarket 
main effects are strongly significant (in both cases p<0.001). In contrast, information restrictions 
do not appear to be significant (p=0.580). The significant interaction effect between timing and 
submarket (p<0.001) indicates that the effect of timing restrictions is different in each submarket. 
This reflects our findings that with timing restrictions, volume is elevated in the Middle 
submarket, but suppressed in Early and Late submarkets. By analyzing the treatments with 
trading restrictions (IR and NoInfo treatments), we see that the significant elevation in volume 
for these treatments in the Middle submarket, relative to the NoRes treatment reflects a 
statistically significant shift in volume from the Early and Late submarkets to the Middle 
submarket.  For markets with timing restrictions, volume in the Middle submarket is 
significantly greater than that in each of the Early and Late submarkets (p<0.001), and Early 
submarket volume is also greater than that in the Late submarket (p=0.030).9  Figure 1, Graph A 
                                                
9
 Separate submarket ANOVAs, show that in the Early submarket only, information restrictions reduce volume 
significantly (p=0.054). 
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presents the evolution of average volume for each ten-second interval and indicates that the intra-
market behavior of NoRes volume is consistent with U-shaped patterns, indicative of elevated 
volume at the start and end of trading noted by McInish, and Wood (1990) and Hameo and 
Hasbrouck (1995) for equity markets and by Bloomfield, Easley and O’Hara (2005) on 
experimental data.  When restrictions are in force, Early market average interval volume for the 
IR and NoInfo treatments are substantially lower than for the NoRes treatment and lower than 
for intervals in the Middle submarket when IR and NoInfo volume rises.  
Figure 1 
Table 4 provides average submarket volume information on a per active-trader basis, allowing us 
to control for differences across treatments caused by the diverse number of traders participating 
in the submarkets.  Average volume per active-trader, for a submarket and treatment, is 
calculated by dividing the corresponding volume per market by the number of traders in the 
submarket. Average volume per trader across all submarkets equals the sum of the submarket 
averages when the number of traders is the same across each submarket, which is the case for the 
NoRes treatment.10 
Table 4 
While Table 3 indicated that trading activity is suppressed by the imposition of trading 
restrictions, Table 4 shows that per active-trader volume on average across all sessions and 
markets is actually higher when trading restrictions apply. Although each individual restricted 
trader is trading more actively when they can there are fewer active traders during the non-
overlap submarkets because of restrictions. The ANOVA results show that the effect of timing 
                                                
10 The formulae for the IR and NoInfo treatments are provided in the Appendix. 
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restrictions is statistically significant (p=0.017), but that the effect of information restrictions is 
not (p=0.496).  
 The effect of submarket is significant (p<0.001) and the interaction of submarket and 
timing restrictions is also significant (p<0.001) mirroring the results for average volume, and 
reflect the pattern of per active-trader volume across the different treatments and submarkets. As 
with overall volume, we find that volume per active-trader is elevated in the Middle submarkets 
but suppressed in the Early submarket, when timing restrictions are in place.  Displacement of 
trading activity, on a per active-trader basis, to the Middle submarket and from both the Early 
and Late submarkets remains significant for markets with timing restrictions, (p<0.001). 
Moreover, in the IR treatment, the Early submarket per active-trader volume (1.78 trades) is also 
higher than in the Late market (1.34 trades). In the NoInfo treatment, however, the per active-
trader volume is the same in the Early and Late submarkets (1.50 trades).  Overall, our result that 
timing restrictions displace volume to the overlap submarket is still robust on a per active-trader 
basis.  
Average per active-trader volume associated with the submarkets also confirms the 
existence of elevated trading activity in the Early submarket when no trading restrictions exist. 
When there are no timing restrictions, volume per trader during the Early market is significantly 
higher than in both the Middle submarket (p=0.001) and the Late submarket (p<0.001), while the 
Middle submarket per active-trader volume is higher than the Late submarket (p=0.052).  
Panel B provides a breakdown of trading activity by informed and uninformed traders 
and shows that without trading restrictions average per trader volume for both uninformed and 
informed traders declines after the Early market reaching its lowest average value in the Late 
market. Early traders trade less in the Early market than they do in the Middle market, especially 
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if they are uninformed. Late traders display elevated activity in the Middle market, especially if 
they are uninformed. For both informed and uninformed traders average per trader volume 
declines substantially in the Late market. Middle volume appears to be elevated therefore 
because Early uninformed and informed traders shift their trading to the Middle and because 
Late traders trade more in the Middle, their first opportunity to trade.  Figure 1, Graph B presents 
the average ten-second interval volume per trader across the Early, Middle and Late submarkets 
and shows that average volume per active trader is elevated for Middle market interval for 
treatments with timing restrictions.            
B. Submission and Take Rates 
In Table 5 and 6 respectively, we provide information about liquidity provision and take 
rates.11  Panel A of each table provides average rates for each treatment and each submarket, 
Panel B decomposes the information by trader type.  
Table 5 
Figure 2 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that, for all three treatments, the submission rates of limit 
orders peak in the Early submarket, and then decline as we move to the Middle and Late 
submarkets.  The ANOVAs  indicate that the presence of timing restrictions increases limit order 
submission rates in all submarkets, (p<0.001), We also find that submission rates decline 
                                                
11The submission rates are calculated as the total number of limit orders a trader submits (including executed, 
expired and cancelled) relative to the total number of limit and market orders they submit, within a submarket. This 
is averaged across each trader by treatment and by session.  The take rate is calculated as the number of market 
orders relative to the total number of executed limit and market orders for each trader, averaged across traders by 
treatment and by session.  The submission and take rates have been calculated exactly as in Bloomfield et al. (2005). 
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significantly from submarket to submarket, for the treatments with private information 
(p<0.001), but do not decline significantly (p=0.901) after the Middle submarket for the 
treatment without private information. 
These differences are strongly influenced by the number of orders that expire without 
trading activity, which is at a peak during the Early submarket as shown in Figure 2, which 
provides a breakdown of submarket limits that are executed, expire or are cancelled. Unexecuted 
orders are high during the Early market for all treatments because price discovery is taking place, 
encouraging traders to submit more extreme limit orders that are never executed. For example, at 
the start of trading participants may submit limit order buy (sell) trades at very low (high) prices 
as traders are very unsure about the final asset value. These orders are never traded as no one 
wishes to be their counterparty. As trading progresses and prices become more informative fewer 
extreme orders are placed increasing limit order execution rates.  
Figure 2 shows that when trading restrictions apply submitted limit orders are higher in 
each submarket than when no restrictions apply. When restrictions apply, although the average 
number of Middle market submitted limit orders falls, there is a rise in the number of executed 
trades, and it is this rise in the number of executed limits that causes a shift in volume to the 
Middle market as observed earlier. This suggests that the supressed trading in the Early market 
associated with trading restrictions noted in Table 3 and 4 is not due to a lack of limit order 
submissions.  
Table 6 
Table 6 indicates that the overall average of the take rates vary little across treatments.  
This is reflected in the ANOVA results that suggest that neither timing restrictions (p=0.961) nor 
information restrictions (p=0.537) influence take rates. However, there are significant submarket 
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differences, (p<0.001). Without timing restrictions the take rate is highest in the Early market, 
and falls significantly in the Middle submarket (p=0.006) and then falls significantly again in the 
Late market (p=0.010). This pattern is consistent with informed traders more actively exploiting 
an informational advantage in the Early submarket than during the Middle or Late submarkets 
when the informational advantage they have is lower. When timing restrictions exist, take rates 
are lower in the Early market, than when restrictions do not apply (p=0.014). These take rates 
rise significantly in the Middle submarket (p<0.001), and fall significantly (p<0.001) in the Late 
submarket. With timing restrictions, some market orders are displaced to the Middle market 
causing executed orders to rise. 
The decomposition of the submission rates by trader type in Panel B of Table 5 shows 
that when no restrictions exist, the average Early submarket submission rate is 0.60 for both 
informed and uninformed traders falling to 0.51 and 0.48 respectively in the Middle submarket 
and to 0.40 and 0.39 in the Late submarket, indicating an elevated number of submissions in the 
Early submarket for both types of traders.  Trading restrictions also appear to cause an elevation 
in limit order submissions in the Early submarket for these traders. The submission rates for 
informed and uninformed traders are 0.70 and 0.67 respectively, both more than ten percent 
higher than was observed in the NoRes treatment. Submission rates of the Early informed and 
uninformed traders in the Middle submarket are comparable to informed traders that face no 
restrictions. However, Late traders have elevated average submission rates during the Middle 
submarket. It is the behavior of Late traders therefore that gives rise to elevated submission rates 
in the Middle market.  
 Differences in the take rates for informed and uninformed traders are highlighted in Panel 
B of Table 6. Without restrictions, the take rate of informed traders is elevated when compared to 
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the uninformed in the Early submarket, but tend to be below those of uninformed traders in the 
Middle and Late submarkets. This is consistent with informed traders in the Early submarket 
making use of market orders to exploit their information advantage. However, as trading 
progresses and this advantage dissipates, take rates decline. When traders are restricted from the 
Late market their take rates are suppressed in the Early submarket but are higher in the Middle 
submarket. This suggests that restrictions cause a displacement of market orders from the Early 
submarket to the Middle submarket and provides some intuition for why the volume shifts of 
Tables 3 and 4 arise.  
             In contrast, when traders are restricted from participating in the Early market, informed 
traders use an elevated number of market orders when they first have an opportunity to trade. 
This suggests that the restriction on Early submarket trading does not cause a reduction in take 
rates when these traders get their first opportunity to trade. For unrestricted informed traders the 
pattern of take rates through the Early and Middle submarkets is similar to the pattern of take 
rates in the Middle and Late submarkets for informed traders who are restricted from trading in 
the Early submarket. Uninformed traders facing no trading restrictions take liquidity at a fairly 
uniform rate in the Early and Middle submarkets but the rate declines in the Late submarket. 
When there are trading restrictions Early/uninformed traders place market orders at a similar rate 
in the Early and Middle submarkets, but Late/uninformed traders use an elevated number of 
market orders during the Middle submarket.  
This analysis of trader type suggests that Early traders contribute to the trading patterns 
we observed in Table 3 and 4 by suppressing take rates in the Early market and raising them in 
the Middle market relative to NoRes traders, while Late traders raise their Middle market take 
rates in their first opportunity to trade. Early traders with timing restrictions in the Late market 
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therefore defer some of their trading which prevents Early market trading from being elevated 
while their activity combined with that of Late traders in the Middle leads to elevated volume in 
the Middle market.  
Figure 3 
Figure 3 contains plots of average ten-second limit order submission rates and take rates, 
respectively. These show that when there are no restrictions the limit order submission and 
taking rates tend to fall as trading progresses.12  However, when trading restrictions exist (IR and 
NoInfo) the limit order submission rate falls until the end of the Early submarket but rises 
sharply at the start of the Middle submarket, and then continues on a new downward trajectory 
until the start of the Late submarket when submissions rise once again before falling back 
towards the end of the Late submarket.  Take rates for the IR treatment rise after the first interval 
and tend to decline until the start of the Middle submarket when the take rate rises sharply. 
During the Middle market the take rate falls and converges to the take rate of the treatment 
without restrictions by the end of the Middle market. During the Late submarket the IR take rate 
follows a similar path to that of the NoRes take rate.  
C. Price Discovery 
Table 7  
Table 7 presents the mean pricing errors for each submarket, calculated as the absolute value of 
the average transaction price less the asset liquidation value and shows that pricing errors tend to 
decline as trading progresses from the Early to the Late submarket. With no information, the 
expected liquidation value is fifty, making it more difficult to detect departures from price 
                                                
12 The first interval leads to a rise in the take rate for IR and NoRes treatments and the first three for the NoInfo 
treatment but after this take rates decline. 
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efficiency when private information is 40 or 60 so we present results for extreme (20 or 80) and 
non extreme (40 or 60) signals separately. Panel A contains average pricing efficiency results for 
the extreme signal and Panel B for the non extreme signals. Comparisons of Panel A and B show 
that when the asset value is more extreme pricing errors are larger than when the asset value is 
less extreme, (p<0.001).13 
When the asset value is more extreme, pricing efficiency is higher without trading 
restrictions (p=0.033). Pricing efficiency differences across treatments, caused by timing 
restrictions, are most pronounced during the Early submarket, (p=0.068), but decline in the 
Middle and Late submarkets (p>0.319). For the treatments with timing restrictions, informational 
efficiency improves significantly between the Early and Middle submarkets, (p<0.001) falling 
from 19.8 to 15.3. 
Panel B shows that when the asset value is less extreme, timing restrictions do not lead to 
lower pricing errors when all submarkets are considered collectively, (p=0.206). However, the 
effect of submarket is strongly significant, (p<0.001). Separate analyses of the submarkets 
indicate that timing restrictions raise pricing inefficiency in the Early submarket, (p=0.023). 
There is a significant improvement in efficiency between the Early and Middle submarkets 
(p<0.009), and this is not affected by timing restrictions. 
Figure 4 
Figure 4 provides plots of the average pricing error calculated over each ten-second 
interval. Graph A contains plots for markets with the more extreme asset values and Graph B 
contains information for markets with the less extreme asset values.  Both graphs indicate that as 
                                                
13 This result was obtained by combining the extreme and less extreme cases, which are analyzed separately in Table 
5, into a single ANOVA incorporating an extremeness categorical factor. 
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trading progresses pricing errors fall, a pattern noted in other experimental studies such as those 
of Schnitzlein (1996) and Bloomfield, Easley and O’Hara (2005). At the start of the Early 
market, pricing errors are higher when trading restrictions apply but by the start of the Middle 
market pricing efficiency across treatments converges. At the very end of trading, pricing errors 
have a tendency to rise but display no clear-cut pattern related to the treatment. Table 7 and 
Figure 4 indicate that our markets may be less efficient at aggregating information than noted 
previously in many other studies.  A possible explanation is suggested by Schnitzlein (2002) who 
argues that information aggregation is impeded in markets which allow informed and liquidity 
traders to interact when participants are unaware of how many informed traders are participating. 
D. Liquidity 
Hamilton (1979) argued that the increased competition associated with cross-listing will 
lead to higher liquidity and lower spreads as markets compete for order flow. This appears to be 
supported empirically. Both Foerster and Karolyi (1998) and Hargis (2000) show that when 
Toronto and Latin American stocks respectively are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange average 
spreads decline. Moreover, Werner and Kleidon (1996) show that US-UK cross-listed stocks 
have lower average spreads than comparable control securities. More recently, Moulton and Wei 
(2009) have shown that the overlap period itself is important in influencing spreads. Their 
intraday analysis of quotes for US stocks listed in European markets shows that spreads for these 
stocks fall at the time the US market opens and rise after the European market closes.  
Table 8  
Figure 5 
Table 8 presents the average time weighted inside spread as defined in McInish and 
Wood (1992, p. 756), obtained from the Early, Middle and Late submarkets for each session and 
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treatment. Across all sessions the Early submarket displays the highest time-weighted average 
spread. This is because the open of the market occurs at the start of the Early period and the open 
of a market is associated with wider posted bid and ask prices due to greater uncertainty 
regarding prices at this time, see for example McInish and Wood (1992).  The ANOVA results 
show that the main effect of submarket is significant, (p<0.001). For each treatment average 
Early submarket spreads are different to Middle and Late submarket spreads (p<0.001) but 
Middle and Late submarket spreads are not found to be statistically different. The three-way 
ANOVA shows that timing restrictions increase spreads (p=0.024).  Early and Middle market 
spreads tend to converge and are not statistically different. 
Figure 5 provides average time-weighted spreads at ten-second time intervals, and shows 
that during most of the intervals an absence of trading restrictions lowers trading costs, although 
during the overlap period differences are very small.  The average interval spread of all 
treatments declines rapidly during the Early submarket, falls less sharply during the Middle 
submarket and rises slightly towards the end of the Late market. A distinctive feature of the IR 
and NoInfo markets is that at the start of the Late market the spread begins to rise noticeably 
before receding after the first few intervals.  
We find that when overlapping markets are perfectly integrated, restrictions tend to raise 
spreads.  Therefore the benefits of higher liquidity in actual overlapping markets, apparent in 
empirical studies, appears to be more to do with the information benefits provided by the market 
opening rather than the overlap itself.  Since our markets are by construction fully integrated, it 
suggests that empirical studies of cross-listed stocks are not studying fully integrated markets.  
E. Adverse Selection 
      Table 9 
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Table 9 reports average total market dollar gains and average per trade gains to informed 
traders for the Early, Middle and Late submarkets as well as for the overall market. The gain 
from a purchase is the liquidation value less the price.  For a sale, it is the price minus the 
liquidation value.  Total Gain represents profits from both purchases and sales by all informed 
subjects measured in trading dollars, on a per period basis, in trades with uninformed traders.  
The Per Trade column reports the average gain to informed subjects per trade.  
 Without trading restrictions gains decline as trading progresses in total and on a per trade 
basis but total gains shift away from the Early submarket to the Middle submarket when trading 
restrictions exist. When trading restrictions do not exist the uninformed are exploited heavily 
during Early trading, but with trading restrictions the informed are unable to exploit the 
uninformed as rapidly. These shifts mirror the patterns associated with volume and appear to 
support Chowdry and Nanda (1991) who predict that informed traders are more likely to exploit 
the uninformed in thick markets.   
In the NoRes treatment, on either a total gain or per trade basis, profits in the Early 
submarket are substantially higher than in the Middle submarket (p<0.001) and in the Late 
submarket (p<0.001). When timing restrictions apply total gains are significantly higher in the 
Middle submarket than in the Early submarket (p=0.015).14  On a per trade basis average Early 
per trade gains are significantly higher than Middle or Late gains (both have a p<0.001). 
Although Early per trade gains are higher than Middle market gains the steep decline in profits 
observable for markets without restrictions in the Middle market is not as dramatic.  Overall, our 
analysis of adverse selection costs indicates that trading restrictions influence the amount and 
timing of insider profitability. 
                                                
14 Middle submarket profits are also higher than in the Late submarket (p<0.001). 
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V. Conclusions 
 Our experiments compare asset markets with and without trade timing restrictions.  With 
timing restrictions, some subjects can trade in the Early submarket, some can trade in the Late, 
but all can trade in the overlap. This corresponds roughly to overlapping markets for cross-listed 
shares, such as for shares cross-listed on the NYSE and the LSE.  However, in our Middle 
submarket, trading occurs in an integrated, single market.  Experimental methodology allows us 
to study simplified markets without real-world factors such as differential information, cultural 
differences or any other costs of trading across markets.  Despite full integration in the Middle 
submarket, market quality is not the same as if all markets were open all the time and any subject 
could trade at any time. 
 Our main findings pertain to the effect of trade timing restrictions. Without restrictions, 
trading was heaviest in the Early period, with activity typically declining as the period 
progressed.  When trade timing restrictions are in effect, trading activity is shifted to the Middle 
submarket.  This concentration of activity in the overlap period supports theoretical predictions 
by Menkveld (2008) and corresponds with empirical findings surveyed by Karolyi (2006). Our 
analysis of individual trader activity also shows that trading restrictions have different effects in 
the Early and Late submarkets.  Restrictions on Late trading causes trading activity to be delayed 
from the Early submarket to the Middle submarket while restrictions on Early trading cause more 
active trading when they can first trade i.e. the Middle market. An important prediction 
associated with cross-listed stocks is that dual or multiple listings outside the domestic market 
lead to lower spreads. Our results confirm this as trading restrictions tend to raise spreads. 
However, in our perfectly integrated experimental market we do not find lower spreads during 
the overlap.  
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Trade timing restrictions also influenced price discovery and the profits of informed 
traders. Price discovery tends to be slower in markets with restrictions when the asset value is 
more extreme. With restrictions informed traders achieved greater profits and uninformed traders 
sustained greater losses.  Overall trader gains for the informed shift from the Early to the Middle 
submarket when trading restrictions exist suggesting that informed traders prefer to exploit the 
uninformed in thicker markets.     
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Appendix The computation of Volume and Volume per Active-Trader 
 
A. Volume 
 Let the volume within sub-market m, for all periods (markets) with treatment t, in session s, be 
denoted 𝑉 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠 . Let the number of periods (markets) of treatment t be denoted 𝑃 𝑡 . Then, for 
Table 3, the average Volume (per period, across all sessions) statistics for a particular treatment 
are calculated using the following formulae. 
 
Market Submarket 𝑉 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠!!!!!!!!!11×𝑃(𝑡) = 𝑉 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠11  ×𝑃 𝑡!!!!!!!!!  𝑉 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠!!!!!11×𝑃 𝑡 = 𝑉 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠11  ×𝑃 𝑡!!!!!  
 
B. Volume per Active-Trader 
Let N(m,t,s) be the number of traders in sub-market m, of treatment t in session s, and 𝑉 𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠  
and 𝑃 𝑡  remain as defined for the Volume calculations. The Volume per Active-Trader 
calculations corresponding to the Volume calculations above are given in the Table below. In the 
Market column, the scaling by three avoids a triple counting of the number of traders across the 
three submarkets, so that when the number of traders is the same across submarkets (NoRes 
treatment only), the averages in the Market column are equal to the sum of the Submarket 
averages. 
Market Submarket 𝑉(𝑚𝑡, 𝑠)!!!!!!!!!𝑃(𝑡)× 𝑁(𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠)!!!!! /3!!!!  𝑉(𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠)!!!!!𝑃 𝑡 × 𝑁(𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠!!!!! ) = 𝑉(𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠)𝑃 𝑡 ×𝑁(𝑚, 𝑡, 𝑠)!!!!!  
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Table 1: Trader Roles 
At the start of each period, traders receive an initial endowment of shares of the risky asset and cash.  
Informed traders also learn the liquidation value of the risky asset.  Liquidity traders only know the 
probability distribution of possible outcomes.  Liquidity traders also may receive a cash bonus/penalty.  
The bonus or penalty is applied to the trader’s cash balance after the Late submarket, just prior to 
liquidation of the risky asset.   
 
 
 
 
 
Initial Endowment 
 
Cash Bonus/Penalty 
 
Informed Traders 
 
 
2 Shares 
$300 
 
 
None 
 
Liquidity Buyers 
 
 
0 Shares 
$500 
 
 
5% penalty 
 
Liquidity Sellers 
 
 
3 Shares 
$200 
 
 
5% bonus 
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Table 2: Experimental Design 
Our experimental design contains three treatments.  The main treatment, IR, has informed traders as well 
as trading restrictions.  Each of the control treatments eliminates one of these features.  NoRes eliminates 
timing restrictions.  NoInfo eliminates informed traders. 
 
 Informed Traders 
 
Informed traders know the 
exact asset value prior to the 
start of the markets.  Other 
traders only know the 
probability distribution of the 
asset value. 
 
No Informed Traders 
 
All traders know only the 
probability distribution of the 
asset value. 
Timing Restrictions 
 
Early traders can trade in both 
the Early and Middle 
Submarkets.  Late Traders can 
trade in both the Middle and 
Late Submarkets 
 
IR Periods 
 
1/3 Informed traders 
1/3 Liquidity buyers 
1/3 Liquidity sellers 
 
1/2 Early traders 
1/2 Late traders 
 
10 periods: 
3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 
14, 15, 19, 20 
NoInfo Periods 
 
1/2 Liquidity buyers 
1/2 Liquidity sellers 
 
 
1/2 Early traders 
1/2 Late traders 
 
5 periods: 
1, 6, 11, 16, 17 
 
 
 
 
No Timing Restrictions 
 
All traders can trade in the 
Early, Middle and Late 
Submarkets. 
 
 
NoRes Periods 
 
1/3 informed traders 
1/3 liquidity buyers 
1/3 liquidity sellers 
 
 
5 periods: 
2, 7, 12, 13, 18 
 
 
                                                                                        
                 
 Trading Restrictions 
 
 Early market 
60 seconds 
Middle market 
60 seconds 
Late market 
60 seconds 
Early traders Active Active Inactive 
    
Late traders Inactive Active Active 
    
Both traders Active Active Active 
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Table 3: Trade Patterns 
Average Volume is the mean number of transactions per market, averaged by treatments.  Fraction Early, 
Middle and Late are the percent of the transactions per market in the Early, Middle and Late submarkets. 
The ANOVA of submarket volume, using all treatments, sessions and all submarkets, is reported in the 
All submarkets column of the All treatments block of Panel B Columns Early, Middle and Late report 
separate ANOVA results using only the volume for that submarket. Column Total uses market volume 
(the sum of the three submarket volumes). The ANOVAs by treatment use all submarket volumes for a 
given treatment. The effect of submarket is reported in the column All submarkets, and (two-tailed) pair-
wise tests of differences between the submarket volumes are given in the columns labeled Early v 
Middle, Middle v Late and Early v Late. 
 
Panel A 
Treatment Average Volume 
Fraction 
Early % 
Fraction 
Middle % 
Fraction 
Late % 
NoInfo 69.5 21.0 59.5 19.5 
NoRes 89.8 41.6 32.3 26.1 
IR  71.2 23.7 58.7 17.6 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA (two-tailed p-values) 
All treatments 
 All submarkets Early Middle Late Total 
Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Information 0.580 0.054 0.878 0.379 0.641 
Submarket < 0.001     
Submarket * Timing < 0.001     
Submarket * Information 0.237     
By treatment  - Submarket Main effect 
 All submarkets Early v Middle Middle v Late Early v Late 
Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.030 
No Timing < 0.001 0.001 0.043 < 0.001 
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Table 4: Volume Per Active-Trader 
Per Active-Trader Volume, Early, Middle and Late are the mean number of transactions per active-trader 
per submarket, averaged (across markets) by treatments in the Early, Middle and Late submarkets. Per 
Active-Trader Volume is the mean number of transactions per trader per market, averaged (across 
markets and sessions)  by treatments. This does not equal the row-wise sum of the sub-market volumes 
per active-trader, except in the case of NoRes, because the sum of ratios are not generally equal to the 
ratio of sums, and there are different numbers of traders across the three submarkets in the NoInfo and IR 
treatments. Panel B decomposes Panel A of the table by trader type. Since each trade has two sides, these 
statistics are computed out of twice volume. The ANOVA of submarket volume per active-trader, using 
all treatments, sessions and submarkets, is reported in the All submarkets column of the All treatments 
block of Panel C. Columns Early, Middle and Late report separate ANOVA results using only the volume 
per active-trader for that submarket. The ANOVAs by treatment use all submarket volumes per active-
trader for a given treatment. The effect of submarket is reported in the column All submarkets, and  (two-
tailed) pair-wise tests of differences between the submarket volumes per active trader are given in the 
columns labeled Early v Middle, Middle v Late and Early v Late. 
 
Panel A 
                    Treatment 
Per Active- 
Trader 
Volume 
Per Active-
Trader Volume 
Early 
Per Active-
Trader Volume 
Middle 
Per Active-
Trader Volume 
Late 
NoInfo 5.57   1.50 2.20 1.50 
NoRes 4.77   1.98 1.54 1.25 
IR  5.70   1.78 2.22 1.34 
 
 
Panel B 
Treatment Timing Information Early Middle Late 
NoInfo Early Uninformed 1.50   2.13     
 Late Uninformed    2.26   1.50  
NoRes Both   Informed 2.04   1.37   1.07  
 Both Uninformed 1.96   1.62   1.34  
IR Early Informed 1.86   2.07     
 Early Uninformed 1.76   2.18     
 Late Informed    2.11   1.15  
 Late Uninformed    2.41   1.44  
 
Panel C: ANOVA (two-tailed p-values) 
All treatments 
 All submarkets Early Middle Late 
Timing 0.017 0.099 < 0.001 0.616 
Information 0.496 0.027 0.860 0.296 
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Submarket < 0.001    
Submarket * Timing 0.001    
Submarket * Information 0.094    
By treatment  - Submarket Main effect 
 All submarkets Early v Middle Middle v Late Early v Late 
Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.001 
No Timing < 0.001 0.001 0.052 < 0.001 
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Table 5: Limit Order Submission Rates 
Limit order submission rates are calculated as the ratio of total submitted limit orders (includes executed, 
expired and cancelled orders) to total submitted limit and market orders, using all markets. Figures in the 
All column are the per trader average submission rates across all submarkets, averaged by treatment. 
Panel B decomposes averages according to the type of trader that posted the limit order. The ANOVA of 
submarket submission rates, using all treatments, sessions and all submarkets, is reported in the All 
submarkets column of the All treatments block of Panel C. Columns Early, Middle and Late report 
separate ANOVA results using only the submission rates for that submarket. The ANOVAs by treatment 
use all submarket submission rates for a given treatment. The effect of submarket is reported in the 
column All submarkets, and (two-tailed) pair-wise tests of differences between the submarket submission 
rates for a given treatment are given in the columns labeled Early v Middle, Middle v Late and Early v 
Late. 
 
Panel A 
                  Treatment All Early Middle Late 
NoInfo 0.59 0.68 0.56 0.55 
NoRes 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.39 
IR  0.56 0.68 0.54 0.48 
 
Panel B 
Treatment Timing Information Early Middle Late 
NoInfo Early Uninformed 0.68 0.51  
 Late Uninformed  0.61 0.55 
NoRes Both   Informed 0.60 0.51 0.40 
 Both Uninformed 0.60 0.48 0.39 
IR Early Informed 0.70 0.51  
 Early Uninformed 0.67 0.50  
 Late Informed  0.58 0.47 
 Late Uninformed  0.57 0.48 
 
Panel C: ANOVA (two-tailed p-values) 
All treatments 
 All submarkets Early Middle Late 
Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 0.005 0.001 
Information 0.007 0.937 0.216 0.002 
Submarket < 0.001    
Submarket * Timing 0.427    
Submarket * Information 0.075    
By treatment  - Submarket Main effect 
 All submarkets Early v Middle Middle v Late Early v Late 
Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 0.006 < 0.001 
No Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 0.002 < 0.001 
Information < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
No Information < 0.001 < 0.001 0.901 < 0.001 
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Table 6: Take Rates 
This table presents the take rate, defined as the ratio of all market orders to the sum of executed limit and 
market orders using all markets and is presented by treatment. Panel B decomposes the averages by the 
type of trader that accepted a posted limit order. The ANOVA of submarket taking rates, using all 
treatments, sessions and all submarkets, is reported in the All submarkets column of the All treatments 
block of Panel C. Columns Early, Middle and Late report separate ANOVA results using only the take 
rates for that submarket. The ANOVAs by treatment use all submarket take rates for a given treatment. 
The effect of submarket is reported in the column All submarkets, and (two-tailed) pair-wise tests of 
differences between the submarket take rates for a given treatment are given in the columns labeled Early 
v Middle, Middle v Late and Early v Late. 
 
Panel A 
Treatment All Early Middle Late 
NoInfo 0.40 0.37 0.44 0.36 
NoRes 0.38 0.43 0.38 0.33 
IR  0.39 0.40 0.43 0.32 
 
Panel B 
Treatment Timing Information Early Middle Late 
NoInfo Early Uninformed 0.37 0.42  
 Late Uninformed  0.45 0.36 
NoRes Both   Informed 0.49 0.31 0.28 
 Both Uninformed 0.41 0.41 0.35 
IR Early Informed 0.42 0.38  
 Early Uninformed 0.39 0.41  
 Late Informed  0.49 0.28 
 Late Uninformed  0.45 0.34 
 
Panel C: ANOVA (two-tailed p-values) 
All treatments 
 All submarkets Early Middle Late 
Timing 0.961 0.014 < 0.001 0.623 
Information 0.537 0.235 0.630 0.125 
Submarket < 0.001    
Submarket * Timing 0.007    
Submarket * Information 0.130    
By treatment  - Submarket Main effect 
 All submarkets Early v Middle Middle v Late Early v Late 
Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
No Timing < 0.001 0.006 0.010 < 0.001 
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Table 7: Pricing Error by Submarket 
Pricing Error is the absolute value of the difference between the average price in a submarket and the 
liquidation value of the asset, averaged across markets and by treatment. Panels A and B separate the 
markets that have more extreme (20 or 80), or less extreme (40 or 60) liquidation values. The ANOVA of 
submarket pricing errors, using both treatments, all sessions and all submarkets, is reported in the All 
submarkets column of the All treatments block of the ANOVA table. Columns Early, Middle and Late 
report separate ANOVA results using only the pricing error for that submarket. The ANOVAs by 
treatment use all submarket pricing errors for a given treatment. The effect of submarket is reported in 
the column All submarkets, and (two-tailed) pair-wise tests of differences between the submarket pricing 
error are given in the columns labeled Early v Middle, Middle v Late and Early v Late. 
 
Panel A:  Markets where the asset liquidation value is more extreme (20 or 80) 
                                  Treatment Pricing Error 
Early 
Pricing Error 
Middle 
Pricing Error 
Late 
 NoRes 17.0 13.40 12.8 
 IR 19. 8 15.3 13.9 
ANOVA (two-tailed p-values) 
All treatments 
 All submarkets Early Middle Late 
Timing 0.033 0.068 0.319 0.340 
Submarket < 0.001    
Submarket * Timing 0.711    
By treatment - Submarket Main effect 
 All submarkets Early v Middle Middle v Late Early v Late 
Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 0.755 < 0.001 
No Timing 0.129 0.264 0.916 0.129 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Markets where the asset liquidation value is less extreme (40 or 60) 
                      Treatment Pricing Error 
Early 
Pricing Error 
Middle 
Pricing Error 
Late 
 NoRes 5.29 3.05 2.47 
 IR 7.17 3.02 2.70 
 
ANOVA (two-tailed p-values) 
All treatments 
 All submarkets Early Middle Late 
Timing 0.206 0.023 0.772 0.726 
Submarket < 0.001    
Submarket * Timing 0.084    
By timing restriction - Submarket Main effect 
 All submarkets Early v Middle Middle v Late Early v Late 
Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 0.946 < 0.001 
No Timing 0.001 0.009 0.696 0.001 
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Table 8: Average Time-Weighted Quoted Inside Spreads by Submarket 
The average time-weighted quoted spread in a submarket is the average posted inside spread weighted 
by how long the quote is outstanding in each interval. These values are averaged by treatment. The 
ANOVA of submarket inside spread, using all treatments, sessions and all submarkets, is reported in the 
All submarkets column of the All treatments block of the ANOVA table. Columns Early, Middle and Late 
report separate ANOVA results using only the spreads for that submarket. The ANOVAs by treatment 
use all submarket spreads for a given treatment. The effect of submarket is reported in the column All 
submarkets, and (two-tailed) pair-wise tests of differences between the submarket spreads for a given 
treatment are given in the columns labeled Early v Middle, Middle v Late and Early v Late. 
 
Panel A 
                                  Treatment   Early  Submarket   Middle  Submarket   Late  Submarket  
   NoInfo   17.91   7.11   5.97  
   NoRes   13.90   6.23   5.11  
   IR   16.39   6.95   6.56  
 
 
 
Panel B ANOVA (two-tailed p-values) 
All treatments 
 All submarkets Early Middle Late 
Timing 0.024 0.202 0.434 0.068 
Information 0.660 0.351 0.954 0.704 
Submarket < 0.001    
Submarket * Timing 0.560    
Submarket * Information 0.454    
By timing restriction  - Submarket Main effect 
 All submarkets Early v Middle Middle v Late Early v Late 
Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 0.629 < 0.001 
No Timing < 0.001 < 0.001 0.206 < 0.001 
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Table 9: Informed Trader Gains 
Trading gains (profits) earned by informed traders are averaged by treatment.  Total Gain measures the 
total profit earned by informed traders through trades with liquidity traders.  The total is calculated as 
the total profit in all submarkets of the treatment divided by the number of markets of the treatment type.  
The per-trade gain divides the total gain by the average number of transactions per period in the 
treatment (using all trades, not just trades between informed and liquidity traders). The ANOVAs of 
submarket total gains and gains per trader, using both treatments, sessions and all submarkets, are 
reported in the All submarkets column of the All treatments block of the ANOVA tables. Columns Early, 
Middle and Late report separate ANOVA results using only the gains for that submarket. The ANOVAs 
by treatment use all submarket gains for a given treatment. The effect of submarket is reported in the 
column All submarkets, and (two-tailed) pair-wise tests of differences between the submarket gains for a 
given treatment are given in the columns labeled Early v Middle, Middle v Late and Early v Late. 
 
Panel A 
                             Treatment 
Early Middle Late 
Total 
Gain 
Per 
Trade 
Total 
Gain 
Per 
Trade 
Total 
Gain 
Per 
Trade 
 NoRes 114.10 3.40 20.60 0.65 11.50 0.52 
 IR 74.90 5.47 120.60 3.38 19.70 2.10 
 
 
 
 
Panel B ANOVA (two-tailed p-values) 
All treatments – Total Gains 
 All submarkets Early Middle Late 
Timing 0.020 0.063 < 0.001 0.241 
Submarket < 0.001    
Submarket * Timing < 0.001    
By treatment  - Submarket Main effect – Total Gains 
 All submarkets Early v Middle Middle v Late Early v Late 
Timing < 0.001 0.015 < 0.001 < 0.001 
No Timing 0.001 < 0.001 0.863 < 0.001 
All treatments – Per Trade Gains 
 All submarkets Early Middle Late 
Timing < 0.001 0.090 < 0.001 0.039 
Submarket < 0.001    
Submarket * Timing 0.445    
By treatment  - Submarket Main effect – Per Trade Gains 
 All submarkets Early v Middle Middle v Late Early v Late 
Timing < 0.001 0.015 0.312 < 0.001 
No Timing 0.001 < 0.001 0.937 < 0.001 
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Figure 1: Trading Activity 
These charts contain plots of average treatment volume (Graph A) and average treatment per active 
trader volume (Graph B) calculated at intervals of ten seconds. The first minute coincides with the Early 
market, the second minute coincides with the Middle market and the final minute coincides with the Late 
market.  NoRes is the treatment with no timing restrictions, IR is the treatment with trading restrictions 
and NoInfo is the treatment with no informed traders. 
 
Graph A:  Intra-market Volume 
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Graph B: Intra-market Volume per Active Trader 
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Figure 2: Limit Order Analysis 
This figure provides a breakdown of limit order submissions according to whether the limit order 
expired, was cancelled or executed during the submarket. Limit orders are number of limit order 
submitted by informed and uninformed traders.  Market orders are those limit orders executed as market 
orders during each sub-market. Expired limit orders are those orders unexecuted during the submarket. 
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Figure 3: Submission and Take Rates 
These charts contain plots of the average treatment limit order submission rate (Graph A) and the take 
rate (Graph B) per trader calculated at intervals of ten seconds. The first minute coincides with the Early 
market, the second minute coincides with the Middle market and the final minute coincides with the Late 
market.  NoRes is the treatment with no restrictions, IR is the treatment with trading restrictions and 
NoInfo is the treatment with no informed traders. 
 
Graph A: Intra-market Limit Order Submission Rates 
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Graph B: Intra-market Take Rates 
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Figure 4: Intra-market Price Efficiency 
This chart contains plots of average treatment pricing efficiency calculated at intervals of ten seconds, for 
markets with extreme asset values (Graph A) and for markets where asset values are not extreme (Graph 
B). The first minute coincides with the Early market, the second minute coincides with the Middle market 
and the final minute coincides with the Late market.  NoRes is the treatment with no restrictions, IR is the 
treatment with trading restrictions and NoInfo is the treatment with no informed traders. 
 
Graph A: Extreme Asset Values 
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Graph B: Non-Extreme Asset Values 
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Figure 5: Intra-market Time-Weighted Bid-Ask Spread 
This chart contains plots of the average treatment time-weighted bid-ask spread calculated at intervals of 
ten seconds. The first minute coincides with the Early market, the second minute coincides with the 
Middle market and the final minute coincides with the Late market.  NoRes is the treatment with no 
restrictions, IR is the treatment with trading restrictions and NoInfo is the treatment with no informed 
traders. 
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